Modeling R&D projects using game theory tools

The article is devoted to development and evolving a theoretical basis for modeling strategic interactions that arise during the R&D project implementation. The relevance of the work lies in increasing the effectiveness of decisions made on the R&D projects management and the corresponding improvement in the quality of research and development. As a result of the study, a basic game-theoretic model of strategic interaction between the R&D project stakeholders has been developed, which is designed to develop particular models of strategic interactions that arise during the R&D project implementation, using a special method, also proposed in the article. Together, the results of the research make it possible to evaluate the equilibrium optimality outcomes of individual strategic interactions, as well as to evaluate the effectiveness of measures to improve their optimality. The results of the study are scientifically novel and are aimed at developing the methodological and instrumental base of game theory in the direction of managing R&D projects

Keywords: game theory, management, modeling, optimization, R&D project, stakeholder, strategic interaction


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